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INTRODUCTION
[T]he jury system calls on the lawyer to have faith in the common
man--that the average citizen can be relied on, when given an adequate
explanation, to understand a problem, apply reason to it, and arrive at a
wise solution. This faith in the common man to solve his problems by
his own reason is of the essence of a democracy.'
The grand jury occupies a unique place in the American criminal justice
system. Prior to the trial of a criminal case, it provides the only forum for citizen
review of, and input into, the criminal process.2 With the criminal trial becoming
increasingly rare, the grand jury often provides the only such opportunity for
citizen involvement.3 The historical importance of civic participation in the
criminal justice system via the grand jury is difficult to understate: as an institution,
the grand jury is nearing its nine-hundredth year,4 and across the centuries English
and American grand juries have served roles as diverse as shielding the accused
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1999,
Wake Forest University. I wish to dedicate this Note with love to Molly Sweep, and to my
family and my friends, for whose help and support I am very grateful.
1. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 179-80 (5th Cir. 1965) (quoting E.R. Mattoon,
The Lawyer as a Social Force, 15 ALA. LAW. 55, 64 (1954)).
2. Ric Simmons, Re-examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the
Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REv. 1, 3 (2002).
3. Id.
4. See infra Part I.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
from politically unpopular prosecutions,5 topplinf corrupt municipal officials, 6 and
supervising the infrastructure of cities and towns.
The Constitution reflects the historical importance of the grand jury and
guarantees its continuing involvement in the criminal justice system.8 As has often
been observed in recent years, however, the contemporary grand jury is an
institution adrift from its historical moorings.9 Commentators have noted that, far
from its intended role as a neutral panel that reviews evidence and determines
whether an indictment should be returned, the modem grand jury is "little more
than a rubber stamp, indiscriminately authorizing prosecutorial decisions."'
0
Because the grand jury is no longer an independent body, but rather an arm of the
prosecution, it cannot effectively serve its potential role as the community's voice
in the criminal justice system.'"
The issue of grand jury independence came to the fore recently in the Ninth
Circuit's decision in United States v. Marcucci.12 The defendants in Marcucci
argued that the district court should have dismissed their indictments because the
district court's instructions to the grand jury, which were based on the Model
Grand Jury Charge recommended by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, "misstated its constitutional role and function."' 3 The basis of the error,
they argued, was the district court's failure to inform the grand jury of its power to
refuse to indict them, even if the government presented sufficient evidence for the
grand jury to find probable cause to support an indictment. 14 A panel of the Ninth
Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the district court's instruction to the
jurors that they "should" indict the defendant if they found probable cause left
"room--albeit limited room-for a grand jury to reject an indictment that, although
supported by probable cause, is based on governmental passion, prejudice, or
injustice." 15 A spirited dissent 16 argued that the majority opinion "fail[ed] to accord
appropriate deference to the elevated status of the grand jury" by infringing on the
5. See Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the
Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 260, 281-84 (1995).
6. See RicHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL 234-36 (1963).
7. See id. at 15-18 (discussing role of colonial grand juries in monitoring the condition
of public roads, bridges, and buildings, and reporting to the court on deficiencies in the
same).
8. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees, "No person shall
be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury.... US CONST. amend V.
9. The literature detailing, and usually lamenting, the grand jury's loss of its traditional
independence is quite extensive. See, Judith M. Beall, Note, What Do You Do with a
Runaway Grand Jury?: A Discussion of the Problems and Possibilities Opened up by the
Rocky Flats Grand Jury Investigation, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 617, 630-32 (1998); Susan W.
Brenner, The Voice of the Community: A Case for Grand Jury Independence, 3 VA. J. Soc.
POL'Y & L. 67, 67-68 (1995); R. Michael Cassidy, Toward a More Independent Grand Jury:
Recasting and Enforcing the Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 13 GEo.
J. LEGAL ETHics 361, 362-63 (2000); Simmons, supra note 2, at 27.
10. Brenner, supra note 9, at 67.
11. See id. at 68.
12. 299 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1600 (2003).
13. Id. at 1158.
14. Id. at 1159.
15. Id. at 1164.
16. Id. at 1166 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
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"requirement of the grand jury's independent exercise of its discretion [which] is a
fixed star in our constitutional universe."17
This Note reviews the continuing issue of grand jury independence with
particular reference to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Marcucci. It argues that the
Marcucci court missed the chance to strike a rare blow for the independence of the
federal grand jury. Part I reviews the history and traditional function of the grand
jury and examines the discrepancy between this historical role-which is still given
great rhetorical respect by the courts-and the modem role of the federal grand
jury. 8 Part II focuses in particular on the controversial power of the grand jury to
refuse to indict an accused even if it determines that sufficient probable cause
exists to return an indictment. It argues that this nullification power, if used
conscientiously, provides a unique opportunity for citizens to make their voices
heard in the criminal justice system, but that the ability to exercise this power
legitimately depends on thorough education of the grand jurors as to the history,
purpose, and role of the grand jury. Part III looks at Marcucci closely, and argues
that the case is consistent with the modem judicial view of grand juries, which pays
lip service to their independence while acquiescing in actions that severely curtail
that independence. Part IV of this Note concludes by arguing that, as a start, a
carefully worded uniform federal grand jury instruction could make limited but real
progress in nudging the grand jury back toward its historically independent role.
Such an instruction, in addition to thoroughly educating grand jurors as to their
task, would also encourage the grand jurors to take upon themselves an active role
in discussing with the government their powers and their function. The result could
be increased civic awareness of the role an independent grand jury plays in
American criminal justice.
I. A BRIEF AND TARGETED HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL GRAND JURY
A. From Serving the King to Protecting His Enemies
The modem federal grand jury is a body of sixteen to twenty-three citizens. 19
The grand jury has the power to issue an indictment2 0 upon the affirmative vote of
twelve or more jurors. In the federal system, grand jurors are selected at random22
from lists of registered or actual voters. The task of the grand jurors is to decide,
based on presentation of evidence by prosecutors, whether probable cause exists to
17. Id. at 1167 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
18. This Note will focus on the federal grand jury. In Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516 (1884), the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury
indictment was not applicable to state prosecutions. However, many states retain the grand
jury system today, and they have generally been more amenable to reforming grand jury
processes than has the federal system. See generally SARA SUN BEALE Er AL., GRAND JURY
LAW AND PRACrnCE § 1:5 (2d ed. 1997).
19. FED. R. CRiM. P. 6(a)(1) ("The grand jury shall consist of not less than 16 nor more
than 23 members.").
20. If the grand jury votes to indict an accused, it is said to return a "true bill" to the
prosecutor. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE Er AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 15.2(g) (3d ed. 2000). A
refusal to indict results in a "no bill" or, traditionally, a finding of "ignoramus" (we ignore
it). Id.
21. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(f).
22. See 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (2000).
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believe the accused committed the crime,23 and whether an indictment should issue.
Grand jury proceedings are conducted in secret: "The press and public are barred
from the proceedings, as are suspects and their counsel. Even judges are not
allowed in the grand jury room; attendance is limited to the prosecutor, the jurors,
the court reporter, and the single witness being questioned. ' '24 If the grand jury
determines the prosecutor's evidence is legally sufficient to support an indictment,
it then decides whether to indict the defendant.
This modem model of grand jury procedure is juite similar to practices
utilized at the time of the Fifth Amendment's adoption. 2 That model was the heir
to an ancient tradition originating with the English King Henry II in the twelfth
century. 26 Under the 1166 Assize of Clarendon, a group of sixteen men were called
together to decide which citizens should be charged with crimes. 27
Because the sheriff could not keep track of all the mischief committed
by the locals, each juror was expected to bring to the proceedings the
names of those suspected of crimes .... [Flines were levied on panels
that failed to indict those whom the Crown considered guilty. As a
result, the earliest grand juries were considered a source of oppression
by the citizenry rather than a protection from it.
28
From its inauspicious beginning as an agent of the crown, however, the grand
jury evolved into a "bastion of popular rights." 29 Less than one hundred years after
its inception, the grand jury was considered important enough an instrument of
civic power to be included as a right in the Magna Carta. 30 However, the first true
illustration of the grand jury's use of its power to shield an accused against an
"overzealous prosecutor" did not appear until 1681.31 Charles II wished to
prosecute two citizens, the Earl of Shaftesbury and his follower Stephen Colledge,
for treason, but two London grand juries refused to indict them.32 This celebrated
case deepened the people's respect for the grand jury as an institution with the
23. See Leipold, supra note 5, at 263. In addition to determining whether probable
cause exists to indict an accused (the indicting function), the grand jury plays another role as
well: investigating "whether crimes have been committed and, if so, who committed them."
BEALE ET AL., supra note 18, § 1:7. One federal grand jury can, and usually does, serve both
indicting and investigatory roles. Id. The investigative function is important because the
grand jury possesses the power to subpoena witnesses to testify before the grand jury or to
produce evidence. Id. The subpoena power is an important investigative resource,
particularly because neither police nor prosecutor share it. Id. The dual powers-indicting
and investigating-are traditionally referred to as the "shield" and the "sword" of the grandjury. Id. This Note focuses on the indicting or shield role of the grand jury, because it is that
capacity in which the grand jury has lost its independence.
24. Leipold, supra note 5, at 266.
25. BEALE ET AL., supra note 18, § 1:6. See also United States v. Cleary, 265 F.2d 459,
460 (2d Cir. 1959) (remarking that the grand jury "has remained as free of court-made
limitations and restrictions as it was in England at the time the Fifth Amendment was
adopted").
26. Leipold, supra note 5, at 280.
27. Id. at 281.
28. Id.
29. LEONARD W. LEVY, THE PALLADIUM OF JUSTICE 63 (1999).
30. Brenner, supra note 9, at 69.
31. Simmons, supra note 2, at 8.
32. Id.
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power to shield them from the potentially tyrannical power of the state. 33 The year
after the Shaftesbury affair, the Lord Chancellor of England, Sir John Somers,
wrote that "[g]rand juries are our only security, in as much as our lives cannot be
drawn into jeopardy by all the malicious crafts of the devil, unless such a number




In pre-revolutionary America, the grand jury continued to enjoy a reputation as
a safeguard against prosecutorial mischief or abuse. The institution existed in some
form in every one of the colonies by 1683. 35 Colonial grand juries "gradually
recognized the importance of the grand jury as a direct means of expressing their
grievances against Royalist officials and of blunting the Royalist power to
prosecute by not returning indictments." 36 The most celebrated colonial case of
grand jury independence was that of the publisher John Peter Zenger, whom three
successive grand juries refused to indict for seditious libel of the Royal Governor
of New York in 1743.37 Because of its powerful shield function, the grand jury was
at the time of the nation's founding a "highly esteemed institution." 38 In addition to
its inclusion in the federal Constitution, the grand jury guarantee was also included
in most state constitutions.
39
B. The Prosecutor Captures the Grand Jury
Although independent grand juries flourished in parts of the country during the
nineteenth century,40 the institution's efficacy at the federal level began a decline
that still continues. The reasons for the grand jury's loss of independence, and the
consequent loss of its ability to serve as an effective avenue for civic participation
in the criminal justice system, are not clear, but commentators have offered legal,
historical, and psychological explanations. By the early twentieth century, the
practice of the prosecutor appearing personally before the grand jury to present
evidence had become routine.4 1 The adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure in 1946 further restricted the independence of the grand jury by
33. See LEVY, supra note 29, at 64.
34. Id. (quoting SIR JOHN SOMERS, THE SECURITY OF ENGUSHMEN'S LivEs 64 (1682)).
Blackstone also envisioned the grand jury as a shield of the individual liberties of the people
against the whims of the state, "thus permitting the grand jury to thwart executive impulses
to imprison politically obnoxious subjects or to exile them." Id. at 64-65.
35. LEROY D. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY: THE USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL POWER 13
(1975).
36. Id. at 16. Colonial grand juries also refused to indict the publisher of the Boston
Gazette for libel, as well as the leaders of the Stamp Act riots of Boston. YOUNGER, supra
note 6, at 28.
37. Simmons, supra note 2, at 11.
38. CLARK, supra note 35, at 19.
39. Id.
40. For example, grand juries in the southern states during the Civil War period were
notorious for aggressively indicting slave owners and free blacks who violated existing
slavery laws, and after the war, for refusing to indict whites accused of violent crimes
against newly freed black citizens. Simmons, supra note 2, at 14. "However we may
disagree with these actions today, they served further to popularize the grand jury among the
local population as a body which embodied and furthered the interests of the local
community against an oppressive government, thus reinforcing the institution's reputation as
a bulwark of liberty." Id.
41. Roger Roots, If It's Not a Runaway, It's Not a Real Grand Jury, 33 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 821, 833 (2000).
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abrogating the grand jury's traditional presentment power.42 By restricting the
power of the grand jury publicly to comment upon the results of its investigations,
and to criticize the actions of the government where appropriate, the Federal Rules
"pigeonholed the citizen grand jury into a minor role of either approving or
disapproving of a prosecutor's actions. '43 The federal courts have acquiesced in
this restriction of grand jury powers. 44
While the legal restrictions placed on the federal grand jury tightened in the
twentieth century, the federal criminal law that it was asked to apply became
increasingly complex.45 As a result, the grand jury increasingly came to rely on its
only available source for advice and guidance as to the law-the federal
46prosecutor. While the prosecutor is required to perform the role of independent
grand jury advisor in addition to government advocate,47 the information he
presents to the grand jury is entirely one-sided. The government has no obligation
to present to the grand jury evidence exculpatory to the accused.48 Grand jurors
may consider evidence gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment49 and
hearsay evidence. 50 The accused has no right to testify before the grand jury, and
no right to have counsel present if he does testify. 51 He has no right to present
evidence in his defense. 52 Consequently, the grand jurors hear only the evidence the
prosecutor wants them to hear-"the most inculpatory version of the facts possible,
regardless of whether that version is based on evidence that will be considered at
trial."
53
The prosecutor's influence over the grand jury is exacerbated by the rapport
that develops between prosecutors and grand jurors.54 Although this rapport is
partially the result of the realities of the federal prosecutor-grand juror relationship
(the prosecutor being the sole lawyer the grand jurors regularly interact with, and
carrying the inherent authority of a government figure), it is also cultivated by
42. "A presentment is a grand jury communication to the public concerning the grandjury's investigation. It has traditionally been an avenue for expressing grievances of the
people against government." Id. at 837. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a) advisory committee's note
(stating that "presentment is not included as an additional type of formal accusation, since
presentments as a method of instituting prosecutions are obsolete, at least as concerns the
Federal courts").
43. Roots, supra note 41, at 838.
44. See, e.g., Fields v. Soloff, 920 F.2d 1114, 1118 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that a grand
juror has no federal constitutional right to present information to a court over a prosecutor's
objection); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171-72 (5th Cir. 1965) (holding that the
United States Attorney is not required to validate a grand jury's indictment by signing it).
45. See Brenner, supra note 9, at 72-73 ("While state grand jurors tend to evaluate such
conceptually simple offenses as rape, theft, and murder, federal grand jurors must grapple
with the often arcane intricacies of federal criminal law, which encompass a variety of
legally and factually complex offenses."). Professor Brenner offers as an example the federal
anti-racketeering statute, RICO. Id.
46. Id.
47. This dual role has been described as "the ultimate conflict of interest." Brenner,
supra note 9, at 92.
48. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 55 (1992).
49. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351 (1974).
50. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956).
51. Leipold, supra note 5, at 267.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 267-68.
54. Brenner, supra note 9, at 73.
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effective prosecutors. 55 Because grand juries typically meet regularly for terms of
service that are often eighteen months long, 56 individual prosecutors appear before
them frequently enough for )urors to form positive, even warm feelings for the
prosecutors as professionals.5
The grand jury has evolved from a revered institution notable for its
independence to a tool of the prosecution. In modern practice, it is "naive to cling
to the notion that the grand jury is primarily a protection for the citizenry."
58
Instead, most commentators now agree, the contemporary grand jury is "a tool of
the state, not a bulwark against it. "59 Federal prosecutors often regard obtaining an
indictment as an easy first step in the prosecution of an offense: one government
attorney reported he had obtained fifteen indictments from a grand jury in forty-
five minutes, 60 while another characterized presentations to the grand jury as "brief
and perfunctory, usually consisting of little more than a single government agent
reading enough of the case file to the grand jury to establish probable cause., 61 The
federal judiciary has recognized this fact as well: one federal judge stated that
"[any experienced prosecutor will admit that he can indict anybody at any time for
almost anything before any grand jury."62
The grand jury's current status as "lapdog '63 of the prosecution has been
statistically borne out. In fiscal year 1984, for example, statistics show that federal
grand juries returned to prosecutors 17,419 indictments, compared to sixty-eight no
55. See id. ('TIhis rapport causes jurors to identify with prosecutors, thus increasing
their willingness to follow a prosecutor's lead in... bringing charges .... "); see also FED.
R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(1) advisory committee's note on the 1979 amendment (stating that "a
sophisticated prosecutor must acknowledge that there develops between a grand jury and the
prosecutor with whom the jury is closeted a rapport-a dependency relationship--which can
easily be turned into an instrument of influence on grand jury deliberations"). For an
interesting anecdotal account of the relationship between federal prosecutors and grand
jurors, see BLANCHE DAVIS BLANK, THE NOT So GRAND JURY 23-28, 65-74 (1993).
56. See SUSAN W. BRENNER & GREGORY G. LOCKHART, FEDERAL GRAND JURY: A
GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.6 (1996). Regular grand juries sit for up to eighteen
months; this period can be extended for up to another six months, so grand juries may serve
as long as twenty-four months. Id. at 130. Once impaneled, grand juries hold regular
sessions according to the local rules of the federal district in which they sit. Id. at 13 1-32.
The frequency of these sessions varies from district to district; in smaller districts, the juries
may meet only a few times a month, while in larger districts the sessions may be more
frequent. Id. at 132.
57. BLANK, supra note 55, at 65-74.
58. Id. at7.
59. Id. See also Brenner, supra note 9, at 67 ("[T]he federal grand jury has become little
more than a rubber stamp .. "); Cassidy, supra note 9, at 361 ("The bromide that 'a grand
jury would indict a ham sandwich if the prosecutor asked it to' reflects a generally accurate
belief that the prosecutor exerts primary control over the flow of information before the
grand jury."); Roots, supra note 41, at 821 ("[T]he alleged oversight function of modem
grand juries [is] essentially a tragic sham.").
60. See Simmons, supra note 2, at 32 n.137 (citing an interview with a New York
assistant United States attorney). See also BLANK, supra note 55, at 37 (noting that
"important cases" required five or six hours to present, and on one occasion the grand jury
was asked to indict after a thirteen minute presentation).
61. Simmons, supra note 2, at 32 (citing an interview with a New York assistant United
States attorney).
62. Marvin E. Frankel & Gary P. Naftalis, The Grand Jury: An Institution on Trial, THE
NEW LEADER, Nov. 10, 1975, at 19, 28 (quoting Federal Judge William J. Campbell).
63. Beall, supra note 9, at 629.
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bills, a success rate of 99.6% in obtaining indictments. 6 4 In 2001, federal grand
juries returned only twenty-one no bills.65 These numbers suggest that, whatever
the reason, the federal grand jury now exercises very little power as a shield
between the government and its citizens.
]H. NULLIFICATION: THE POLIICAL POWER OF THE GRAND JURY
A. When Should a Grand Jury Refuse to Indict?
The historical hallmark of the grand jury is its "complete independence in
refusing to indict., 66 Of course, there are several reasons why a grand jury might
return a no bill. Professor Andrew Leipold has divided the cases in which a grand
jury might refuse to indict an accused into the following categories: 1) cases in
which the accused is factually innocent; 2) cases in which the accused is legally
innocent but factually guilty;67 3) cases in which the government fails to make an
adequate showing of evidence to support an indictment; 4) cases in which the
government makes an adequate showing of evidence, but the grand jury disbelieves
the evidence or its probative value; and 5) cases which the grand jury determines
should not go forward for policy reasons. 68 In the first four instances, the grand jury
is asked to analyze a set of facts and apply "a specific legal test-the probable
cause standard" 9 in determining whether an indictment is warranted. A grand
jury's refusal to indict in such situations may provide a useful check on
prosecutorial power: it may discourage prosecutors from accusing suspects based
on weak or incomplete evidence, and it may protect the accused from the stress and
embarrassment of an indictment that the government could not prove at trial.7 °
Because the prosecutor controls the process, however, and can present ex parte the
most inculpatory case possible against the accused, it is unlikely that the grand jury
will often know enough about the evidence in the case to make a meaningful
determination that the evidence is inadequate or somehow flawed. 71 Beyond the
rare instance in which a prosecutor presents plainly insufficient evidence to it,7 2 the
grand jury in its evidence-weighing capacity is incapable of acting as other than a
prosecutorial rubber stamp.
64. Statistical Report of U.S. Attorney's Office, Fiscal Year 1984 (Report 1-21) at 2.
65. Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center, Federal Justice Statistics Database, at
http://fjsrc.urban.org (last visited Jan. 24, 2004).
66. LAFAvE ET AL., supra note 20, at § 15.2(g).
67. That is, cases in which "the defendant committed the crime alleged, but for some
procedural, evidentiary, or other reason there is a legal bar to conviction." Leipold, supra
note 5, at 291.
68. Id. at 290-94.
69. Id. at 264.
70. Id. at 304-10.
71. For example, in United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992), the Supreme Court
held that the prosecutor has no obligation to present to the grand jury evidence exculpatory
to the accused. A grand jury which heard such evidence would be able to balance it against
inculpatory evidence and determine whether the evidence tending to show innocence was
enough to overcome probable cause. Id. 45-47. A grand jury hearing only the evidence
suggestive of guilt could not make this distinction, and would be likely to vote to indict. See
Cassidy, supra note 9, at 386.
72. Because the government controls the evidence the grand jury will hear, prosecutors
rarely present cases which they are not fairly certain will result in indictment. See Leipold,
supra note 5, at 278.
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B. Grand Jury Nullification in the Courts and in History
The fifth situation-in which a grand jury determines for reasons of policy that
the government should not have the power to prosecute a person when there is
probable cause to believe he or she is guilty of a crime-is much different. The
right of the grand jury to shield the guilty from the reach of the government is
controversial, but it is well-established. This "authority of the grand jury to
'nullify' the law arguably was the most important attribute of grand jury review
from the perspective of those who insisted that a grand jury clause be included in
the Bill of Rights." 73 The power has long been recognized by the courts. In Vasquez
v. Hillery,74 the Supreme Court offered perhaps its most influential description of
the independent grand jury:
The grand jury does not determine only that probable cause exists to
believe that a defendant committed a crime, or that it does not. In the
hands of the grand jury lies the power to charge a greater offense or a
lesser offense; numerous counts or a single count; and perhaps most
significant of all, a capital offense or a noncapital offense-all on the
basis of the same facts. Moreover, "[t]he grand jury is not bound to
indict in every case where a conviction can be obtained."
75
Lower courts have frequently recognized this power as well. In United States v.
Cox, 76 the court stated that the grand jury "has the ... unchallengeable power to
shield the guilty, should the whims of the jurors or their conscious or subconscious
response to community pressures induce twelve or more jurors to give sanctuary to
the guilty.
77
The cases that gained the grand jury its reputation as guardian against
overzealous prosecution, in fact, involved this nullification power. In the celebrated
Shaftesbury case,78 for example, the Crown probably presented sufficient evidence
to show that the accused were guilty of treason, at least in the technical sense in
which the English law defined it.79 In that case, then, the "London grand juries did
not protect the innocent by applying a legal standard; rather, they protected the
guilty bK exercising their own independent discretion in a political way."80 The
Zenger grand jury's no bill was likely the product of the political ideology of the
jurors as well; similarly, the failure of southern grand juries to indict those
73. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 20, at § 15.2(g).
74. 474 U.S. 254 (1986).
75. Id. at 263 (quoting United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 629 (2d Cir. 1979)
(Friendly, J., dissenting)).
76. 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965).
77. Id. at 190 (Wisdom, J., concurring specially). See also United States v. Asdrubal-
Herrera, 470 F. Supp. 939, 942 (N.D. I. 1979) (noting that "j]ust as a prosecutor can, in the
exercise of discretion, decline prosecution in the first instance, a grand jury can return a true
bill or a no bill as they deem fit"); In re Kittle, 180 F. 946, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1910) (Hand, J.)
(stating that the grand jury is "an irresponsible utterance of the community at large,
answerable only to the general body of citizens, from whom they come at random, and with
whom they are again at once merged").
78. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
79. See Simmons, supra note 2, at 10.
80. Id.
81. See supra text accompanying note 37.
82. Leipold, supra note 5, at 287.
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continuing to rebel against reconstruction policies had nothing to do with the
question of sufficiency of the evidence.
83
C. Pros and Cons of the Nullification Power
The power of the grand jury to nullify a charge on essentially political grounds
raises serious questions. Most importantly, perhaps, grand jury nullification might
be thought of as fundamentally undemocratic. 84 The criminal law is written by
democratically elected representatives of the people. The enforcement of that law is
delegated to democratically elected members of the executive branch and their
appointees. It is these officials in whom the discretion to investigate and to
prosecute crime lies. Nullification undermines this democratic process by
substituting the will of individual grand jurors for the putative will of the collective,
the voters. 5 In addition, because the power of the grand jury to nullify is absolute,
and because the grand jury is not obligated to reveal the record of its proceedings to
the public,86 the risk that the grand jury will abuse this power by exercising it
discriminatorily or capriciously is significant. 87 For example, a South Carolina
grand jury that refused to indict members of the Ku Klux Klan for assaulting black
citizens in a Reconstruction-era case88 was exercising an unquestioned right in so
refusing. Most people today would be very uncomfortable with-if not outraged
by-this result. The same risk exists with the contemporary grand jury, which
might be influenced by racial prejudice, the notoriety or fame of the accused, or
any number of other factors unrelated to the grand jury's political concern with the
prosecutor's course of action. In individual cases, this use of nullification power
would be unfair (and potentially dangerous, depending on the severity of the
charges against the accused); in the aggregate, it could "be a potent force for
frustrating legitimate societal objectives," 89 including not only crime control, but
also, for example, equal protection of the law and the public perception of
procedural fairness.
90
Despite these serious issues, however, it is still the nullification power that
affords the grand jury its best opportunity to provide an "influential, accurate, and
legitimate community voice' 9 1 in the federal criminal justice system. As a practical
matter, grand jurors are realistically unable to break ranks with the prosecutor on
evidentiary questions or purely legal issues.92 However, policy matters involve only
83. See Simmons, supra note 2, at 14.
84. See Leipold, supra note 5, at 310.
85. Id. at 309.
86. The same is not true in the case of a trial jury. The trial jury's unreviewable
authority to acquit a defendant in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt is analogous to
the grand jury's power to nullify. However, a trial, unlike a grand jury proceeding, is held in
public, and much more information is available about the accused and about the facts of the
case. See Leipold, supra note 5, at 307-10.
87. Id. at 309-10.
88. See YOUNGER, supra note 6, at 129.
89. Leipold, supra note 5, at 309.
90. See Simmons, supra note 2, at 57; see also Frankel & Naftalis, supra note 62, at 9
(arguing that "the very notion of the grand jury as beneficent for a free society would be
subverted by a band of amateurs engaged in .. . indicting or not indicting as their
'independent' and untutored judgment might dictate").
91. Brenner, supra note 9, at 100.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57; see also Leipold, supra note 5, at 304.
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the intuition and conscience of the jurors, their "rough sense of right and wrong." 93
Every citizen is equipped to employ these tools. Substantively, the nullification
power remains important despite its potential for abuse. First, imperfect though it
may be, the nullification power still stands in the path of the prosecutor's otherwise
unreviewable discretion.94 Although we expect the prosecutor to act in the interest
of justice in exercising this discretion, we must remember that the prosecutor is
influenced by a number of sometimes competing forces. Although the individual
assistant United States attorneys who initiate criminal proceedings and the United
States attorneys under whom they work are not themselves elected officials, they
are part of the federal executive framework, and thus may be susceptible to
political or public pressure. 95 In addition, an unethical prosecutor may pursue a
particular defendant for reasons antithetical to the interests of justice in a particular
case. 96 For example, a prosecutor may be motivated by public pressure to solve a
particular crime or series of crimes,9 by the fact that a suspect has an extensive
criminal record and represents a threat regardless of his guilt or innocence in the
particular case before the grand jury, or by a desire to use the pressure of an
indictment to convince the defendant to cooperate in a proceeding against another
suspect.98 Finally, the prosecutor with a heavy caseload may simply not have the
time to distinguish differences in facts and circumstances that might make
particular prosecutions "unfair." The grand jury, "though unelected, represents a
cross-section of the community that hears from the witnesses . . . firsthand and
takes at least a few minutes to consider the facts and the equities in each case."
99
The grand jury, if it is able to act independently, has the capacity to provide the
only counterweight to the structural realities of the system of government
prosecution. The grand jury provides the only opportunity for the "laypeople's
perspective-the voice of the community"' ° to be heard in the criminal charging
process. An independent grand jury that hears the prosecutor's case and decides not
to indict although there is sufficient evidence to do so sends a clear message to the
prosecutor that a cross-section of citizens of the community does not agree with his
actions. On the other hand, an independent grand jury that returns an indictment
"enhance[s] ... the perceived legitimacy"'' 1 of the charges in a way that grand jury
rubber-stamping does not. This is particularly true in cases where the prosecutor's
action may be susceptible to charges of bias or political motivation. 
°2
But a grand jury simply cannot exercise its discretion in an effective manner if
it is not clearly informed of its duties in the criminal justice system. In the recent
case United States v. Marcucci,'13 the Ninth Circuit missed an opportunity to send
a signal to prosecutors and the lower courts that the independent grand jury should
93. Leipold, supra note 5, at 307.
94. See Simmons, supra note 2, at 50.
95. Cf id. (describing similar political pressure on unelected state prosecutors).
96. See Cassidy, supra note 9, at 392.
97. One can easily imagine contemporary examples at the federal level. The political
climate surrounding, for example, post-September 11 terrorist investigations or allegations
of corporate malfeasance following the collapse of Enron might make overzealous
government pursuit of "suspicious" persons more likely.
98. Cassidy, supra note 9, at 392.
99. Simmons, supra note 2, at 51.
100. Brenner, supra note 9, at 121.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. 299 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1600 (2003).
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be taken seriously as a constitutional institution. While this Note will argue that the
court's decision in Marcucci was wrong, it recognizes that it fits nicely with the
modern judicial view of the grand jury, which pays rhetorical service to its role
while showing little concern for the demise of its independence.
III. UNITED STATES V. MARCUCCI: THE NNrrH CIRcurr FOLLOws THE CROWD
A. The Model Grand Jury Charge
United States v. Marcucci was a consolidation of three unrelated cases that
presented the same issue.'0 4 Two of the appellants in the case pleaded guilty to drug
offenses following grand jury indictments; 10 5 the third, Marcucci, was indicted and
then convicted by a jury on a charge of attempted bank robbery.' 6 The drug
offense appellants conditioned their guilty pleas on the opportunity to appeal the
issue of the propriety of the district court's charge to the grand jury in their cases.
Marcucci was initially denied the transcript of the grand jury charge in his case, but
the government conceded that the grand jury charge in his case was "essentially the
same"'1 7 as the one given to the drug offense appellants, and the court allowed him
to appeal the same issue.108
The appellants in Marcucci argued that the district court, in its charge to the
grand juries that indicted them, committed reversible error by failing to give a
nullification instruction-that is, by failing to inform the grand jury that it could
refuse to indict a suspect even if it found there was probable cause to support an
indictment.1°9 This failure, appellants argued, deprived them of "their right to a
grand jury's independent exercise of its discretion."' 10 The district judge in each
case read to the jurors "almost verbatim''"1 the charge recommended for new grand
juries by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts ("Model
Charge")."12 Thus, the Marcucci case was essentially an attack on the
constitutionality of the Model Charge.
104. Id. at 1158.
105. One appellant pleaded guilty to possessing and importing about fifty kilograms of




108. Id. For the full text of the Model Grand Jury Charge that was essentially identical
to the charge given in Marcucci, see infra note 112.
109. Marcucci, 299 F.3d at 1159.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. The charge is reprinted in BEALE ET AL., supra note 18, § 4:5. While the full
charge is somewhat lengthy, the relevant parts are as follows:
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:
Now that you have been empaneled [sic] and sworn as a grand
jury, it is the Court's responsibility to instruct you as to the law which
should govern your actions and your deliberations as Grand Jurors.
The framers of our Federal Constitution deemed the Grand Jury so
important for the administration of justice, they included it in the Bill of
Rights. As I said before, the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides in part that no person shall be held to answer for a
capital or otherwise infamous crime without action by a Grand Jury....
The purpose of the Grand Jury is to determine whether there is
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The Model Charge does not contain an express nullification instruction,
although it does contain language emphasizing the independence of the grand jury
and warning the grand jurors against becoming an "arm of the United States
Attorney's Office."" 3 The Model Charge also instructs the grand jury that it
sufficient evidence to justify a formal accusation against a person. If
law enforcement officials were not required to submit to an impartial
grand jury proof of guilt as to a proposed charge against a person
suspected of having committed a crime, they would be free to arrest a
suspect and bring him to trial no matter how little evidence existed to
support the charge. As members of the Grand Jury, you, in a very real
sense, stand between the government and the accused. It is your duty to
see to it that indictments are returned only against those who you find
probable cause to believe are guilty and to see to it that the innocent are
not compelled to go to trial....
You cannot judge the wisdom of the criminal laws enacted by
Congress, that is, whether or not there should or should not be a federal
law designating certain activity as criminal. That is to be determined by
Congress and not by you.
... Your task is to determine whether the government's evidence
as presented to you is sufficient to cause you to conclude that there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged against him. To put it another way, you should vote to indict
where the evidence presented to you is sufficiently strong to warrant a
reasonable person's believing that the accused is probably guilty of the
offense with which he is charged.
It is extremely important for you to realize that under the United
States Constitution, the Grand Jury is independent of the United States
Attorney and is not an arm or agent of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Internal
Revenue Service, or any governmental agency charged with prosecuting
a crime. There has been some criticism of the institution of the Grand
Jury for supposedly acting as a mere rubber stamp approving
prosecutions that are brought before it by government representatives.
However, as a practical matter, you must work closely with the
government attorneys. The United States Attorney and his assistants
will provide you with important service in helping you to find your way
when confronted with complex legal matters. It is entirely proper that
you should receive this assistance. If past experience is any indication
of what to expect in the future, then you can expect candor, honesty and
good faith in matters presented by the government attorneys. However,
ultimately, you must depend on your own independent judgment, never
becoming an arm of the United States Attorney's office. The
government attorneys are prosecutors. You are not. If the facts suggest
that you should not indict, then you should not do so, even in the face of
the opposition or statements of the United States Attorney.
Id. The court instructing the grand jury that indicted the two drug offense appellants in
Marcucci introduced the two assistant U.S. attorneys working on the case as "two
wonderful public servants [who] are here to assist you in the discharge of your duties."
Marcucci, 299 F.3d at 1159 n.2.
113. Model Grand Jury Charge, reprinted in BEALE Er AL., supra note 18, § 4:5, at 4-19.
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"should vote to indict" the accused upon a showing of probable cause;114 it does not
instruct the grand jury that it "must" or "shall" vote to indict upon probable cause.
The majority rejected the nullification argument. It concluded that the
appellants' argument that a nullification charge was constitutionally required "rests
... on appellants' mistaken construction of the history of the grand jury."1, 5 In fact,
however, the majority's reading of grand jury history was seriously flawed.
B. Grand Jury Nullification: "Political" or "Principled"?
The court noted as an initial matter that the grand jury charge "[did] not
eliminate discretion" on the part of the grand jurors, because it instructed only that
they "should" indict if probable cause was present,1 6 and instructed them as to
their independent role.1 7 While it is true that a thoughtful grand juror who was
listening closely to the instructions might parse the words carefully and understand
her complete freedom to refuse to indict, the realistic chance of this happening is
remote. As the dissenting judge" 8 observed, "the 'should' and 'shall'
distinction . . . is a lawyer's distinction-not a difference to which most lay people
sitting as grand jurors are likely alert."' 1 9 This is particularly true in the context in
which the charge is given-to jurors newly impaneled in a role they have likely
never served before, by a federal district judge who probably does not inspire them
to reflect upon their power to defy the government.
The majority's validation of the grand jury charge based on the presence of the
word "should" and its further instruction that the grand jury is "independent of the
United States Attorney and ... not an arm" of the government disregards a deeper
problem with the charge. As a whole, the charge instructs the grand jury that its
task is to determine whether probable cause exists. A grand juror would necessarily
believe that his sole task is to make that determination-that he had no freedom to
analyze the propriety of the government's actions based on anything but the
evidence presented to him. 120
The claim that the Model Charge preserves independence is true only as far as
it goes; it does instruct the jury that its decision not to indict based on a finding of
lack of probable cause is unassailable regardless of the government's opposition-
but it does not make clear to the grand jury that there is an entirely different class
of cases in which they might, at their discretion, refuse to indict the accused.
121
114. Id.
115. Marcucci, 299 F.3d at 1160.
116. Id. at 1159.
117. Id. at 1163-64.
118. The dissenter in Marcucci, Judge Michael Hawkins, served as United States
attorney for the District of Arizona from 1977 to 1980, giving him extensive first-hand
experience with the grand jury system. See 2 ASPEN PUBLISHERS, INC., Ninth Circuit, in
ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 12, 12 (2003).
119. Marcucci, 299 F.3d at 1170 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
120. See id. (Hawkins, J., dissenting) ("[B]oth 'reminders' of independence cited by the
majority.., occur in the context of telling the grand jurors that their duty is to determine
probable cause.").
121. See id. (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263
(1986)). Judge Hawkins notes that the grand jury charge at the outset instructs the jurors that
"the purpose of the Grand Jury is to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify
a formal accusation against a person." Id. at 1167 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
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The majority in Marcucci was clearly uncomfortable with the idea of an
independent grand jury. The court stated that "the historical function of the grand
jury [is] protecting citizens from unfounded accusations not supported by probable
cause,"'12 but this statement is only partially correct. The court argued that,
historically, refusals to indict "have almost always been as much political as
principled." 123 It is instructive that the court regarded the two motivations-
"political" and "principled"-as mutually exclusive. It is true that some of the most
well known refusals to indict might be characterized as "political" rather than
"principled," not least because we are uncomfortable applying the latter word to a
grand jury's shielding of, for example, a person accused of a racially motivated
crime. 24 And the court expressed concern that grand juries might refuse to indict
based on racial bias or "anti-government sentiment. ' 5 While these concerns are
legitimate, 126 it is a mistake to focus on them exclusively when considering the
grand jury's nullification power. A grand jury might refuse to indict based on its
sense that the interests of justice would not be served by prosecuting a particular
individual. It might believe that a fair law is being applied unfairly given a
particular defendant's circumstances. It might believe that the government is
overzealously prosecuting and imprisoning those accused of certain offenses, such
as drug crimes. It might be concerned that the police in a community are being too
aggressive in their investigations.
To attempt to characterize these motivations as "principled" or "political"-
they may be either, or both, or neither-misses the point. The grand jury in these
cases is acting in its historic role of "conscience of the community," 127 projecting
the voice of the public into the criminal justice system.
The Marcucci case itself presented an ideal opportunity for an independent
grand jury to provide the community's input into the system. The drug offense
appellants in the case were accused of transporting large quantities of marijuana
into the United States. Balanced against this accusation is the fact that one of them
was "young and a first time offender,"' 128 and that the drug involved was marijuana,
as opposed to a more dangerous drug such as heroin or cocaine. 129 Marcucci was
convicted of attempted bank robbery, a serious offense; on the other side of the
scale, a grand jury might weigh heavily his apparent incompetence and naivet6 as a
criminal. The dissent characterizes Marcucci's conduct as "bungl[ing] a rather
pathetic and non-intimidating but no less stupid crime."'1 30 But a grand jury led to
believe that its sole function was to determine the existence of probable cause
would be unlikely to realize that such factors were relevant to its decision to indict.
Had the jury been apprised of this, it might have found it appropriate to provide
"relief where strict application of the law would prove unduly harsh."
' 131
122. Id. at 1164.
123. Id. at 1162.
124. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
125. Marcucci, 299 F.3d at 1163.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 85-90.
127. Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1066 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (quoting 8
ROBERT M. CIPES, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 6.02[1] (3d ed. 1996) (footnotes
omitted)).
128. Marcucci, 299 F.3d at 1172 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
130. Id. (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 1173 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (quoting Gaither, 413 F.2d at 1066 n.6).
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The Marcucci majority argued that the relevant place for consideration of such
factors as the youth of the accused and the circumstances of the offenses is "at
sentencing if the Sentencing Guidelines allow."' 32 While it is true that a district
judge should consider mitigating factors if he has the power to do so at sentencing,
the court's statement betrays a misunderstanding of the nullification power and of
the role of the grand jury itself.
First, there is a vast difference between a grand jury's refusal to indict, which
prevents the government from prosecuting the defendant at all, 133 and a mitigating
factor under the Sentencing Guidelines, which only reduces the prison sentence of
the defendant after he has been indicted, tried, or pled guilty, and been convicted of
the offense. This is cold comfort to a defendant the grand jury might have shielded
from prosecution altogether. Furthermore, even if the defendant is ultimately
acquitted of the offense for which he is indicted, the indictment itself is damaging
to the defendant financially and emotionally, because it means that he must face the
ordeal of a criminal trial. 34
Second, the court's suggestion that the sentencing judge is the only appropriate
party to consider mitigating factors in administering justice denies completely the
potential of the grand jury to provide the voice of the community. A federal judge
may determine, to the extent it is within his discretion to do so under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines,' 35 that a defendant's youth or naivetd warrants a sentence
that is less than the maximum. That is fundamentally different, however, from a
cross-section of the community's citizens sending a message to the government
that, in its judgment, the government is acting overzealously in prosecuting a
fellow citizen.
C. Marcucci: Inside the Judicial Mainstream
Although this Note has argued that the majority's analysis of the grand jury
issue in Marcucci was flawed, 136 the Marcucci court's attitude toward the
132. Marcucci, 299 F.3d at 1163 n.6.
133. In the federal system, a grand jury's return of a no bill is not the same as an
acquittal at trial. If there is an initial refusal to indict, a federal prosecutor may submit the
same case to a different grand jury (or to the same grand jury) until an indictment is
returned. BEALE ET AL., supra note 18, § 8:6, at 8-38; United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S.
407, 413-15 (1920). Double jeopardy does not attach at the indictment stage, because the
grand jury's initial determination of probable cause is not intended to be a conclusive answer
to the question of the accused's guilt or innocence, which is a question for the trial jury.
BEALE ET AL., supra note 18, § 8:6, at 8-37. Therefore, a grand jury's initial refusal to indict
a defendant does not necessarily mean the defendant will never be prosecuted for an offense.
134. See Cassidy, supra note 9, at 403 (noting that "there are substantial costs
associated with indictment which will not be remedied even by a subsequent acquittal, such
as the expense of mounting a defense and the ongoing damage to one's reputation").
135. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (2000). In fact, these particular factors do not support a
sentence reduction. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.1 (2003).
136. If the majority had found error in the district court's instruction, the question of
remedy would have been difficult. In Bank of Novia Scotia v. United States, the Supreme
Court held that an indictment may not be dismissed based on an error in grand jury
proceedings unless the error prejudiced the defendant. 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988). The Court
went on to hold that a presumption of prejudice attaches if "the structural protections of the
grand jury have been so compromised as to render the proceedings fundamentally unfair."
Id. at 257. In Marcucci, the defendants argued that the error was structural because it
removed the possibility that the grand jury would decide not to indict them, and this error
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independent grand jury is consistent with modem judicial thinking. The Supreme
Court "continues to act on the assumption that the screening function works,
regardless of whether it believes it."' 37 This assumption underlies the rhetoric of
numerous Supreme Court and lower federal court cases. Two Terms ago, the
Supreme Court stated that "the Fifth Amendment grand jury right serves a vital
function in providing for a body of citizens that acts as a check on prosecutorial
power."1
38
In practice, however, the courts have approved of procedures that seriously
impugn the independence of the grand jury. For example, the Supreme Court has
held that evidence that would not be admissible at trial is admissible in grand jury
proceedings. 139 It has also held that the government has no obligation to present
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.140 While reasonable concerns underlie these
holdings, they have the effect of depriving the grand jury of information that would
be vital to the exercise of its discretion in performing the screening function.
Further, in United States v. Williams, the Court severely curtailed the power of the
federal courts to supervise grand jury proceedings. Basing its holding on the
grounds of separation of powers, the Court stated that the grand jury is a body
independent of both the prosecutor and the court.'14 To allow close judicial scrutiny
of grand jury proceedings, the Court held, would undermine this independence
from the judiciary. 142 However, removing the grand jury from the courts' scrutiny
in fact increases the grand jury's reliance on the prosecution for guidance, with
serious implications as to its capacity to act independently.
43
was sufficient to "render the proceedings fundamentally unfair." Marcucci, 299 F.3d at
1172. As Judge Hawkins noted in dissent in Marcucci, "it is hard to say with authority that
the deprivation of an adequately-instructed grand jury is or is not 'fundamentally unfair."'
Id. (Hawkins, J., dissenting). A finding of structural error would have major implications, as
it might render every conviction in the Ninth Circuit in which the Model Charge was given
to the grand jury vulnerable to constitutional challenge. Id. at 1162. Such an "extreme result"
is probably unnecessary. Id. The Supreme Court has presumed structural error in the grand
jury system only in cases of racial discrimination in the grand jury selection process. See
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 262 (1986). Although a future change in the Model
Charge would not benefit defendants convicted under the old charge, it would help to
improve grand jury independence in future cases.
137. Leipold, supra note 5, at 270.
138. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 634 (2002) (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370
U.S. 375, 390 (1962) (stating that the grand jury "serves the invaluable function in our
society of standing between the accuser and the accused.., to determine whether a charge is
founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personal ill
will")); see also United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 68 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(same); United States v. John Doe, Inc. 1, 481 U.S. 102, 119 (1987) (same); United States v.
Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 74 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (same);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 687 n.23 (1972) (same).
139. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-52 (1974) (holding that evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is admissible in grand jury
proceedings); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956) (holding that evidence that
is inadmissible at trial because it violates the hearsay rule is admissible in grand jury
proceedings).
140. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 36-37 (1992).
141. See id. at 47-49.
142. Id. at 49.
143. See Cassidy, supra note 9, at 374.
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IV. WILL A NEW GRAND JURY CHARGE SOLVE THE PROBLEM?
A. Reform Proposals
Grand jury reform is like the weather: everybody talks about it, but nobody
actually does anything. Recent movements to reform the federal grand jury have
arisen in the wake of political scandals and have usually focused on curtailing
abuse of the grand jury's powers as an investigatory body. In the aftermath of the
Nixon presidency, concern arose over the Justice De artment's use of grand juries
to harass political opponents of the administration.' The concern culminated in
the proposed federal Grand Jury Reform Act of 1976,145 which contained various
procedural reforms but which was never passed by Congress. The aggressive
pursuit of President Clinton and a number of his administration's officials by grand
juries controlled by independent counsel also led to calls for reform.' 46 Reform
proposals relating to the grand jury's loss of independence as a screening body
have not been tied directly to political scandals, but they have been raised
consistently over the past two decades. Common proposals have included requiring
the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, 147 creating a
"grand jury counsel" position to reduce the grand jury's reliance on the
prosecution, 148 disallowing hearsay testimony before the grand jury, 149 and giving
the grand jury more accurate information as to its role and function. 5 ° Despite
these proposals, there have been few steps taken by Congress.'
5
'
B. Reform: To What End?
In spite of the current attitude of Congress and the federal courts toward the
grand jury, there may be some room for useful change in the grand jury system. A
pertinent question remains, however: given the level to which the independent
grand jury has sunk, what benefits will small changes at the margins provide?
There are two possible answers: first, a grand jury fully appraised of its function
and role will have at least the potential to provide a community voice in the federal
criminal justice system. When deciding whether to indict, grand jurors who are
aware of their power critically to analyze the totality of the circumstances in a case,
and not just the sufficiency of the evidence, will be more likely to exercise their
traditional role as a check on prosecutorial overzealousness. This is a good in its
own right. It may also increase the perceived legitimacy of the criminal process and
increase confidence in the criminal justice system in general. 152
144. See CLARK, supra note 35, at 5-6.
145. S. 3274, 96th Cong. (1976).
146. BEALE ET AL., supra note 18, § 1:9, at 1-36.
147. See Cassidy, supra note 9, at 385-92.
148. See Beall, supra note 9, at 636-37; Brenner, supra note 9, at 124-27.
149. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 2, at 70-71.
150. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 35, at 141-42.
151. "The last major effort by Congress at federal grand jury reform" was the Grand
Jury Reform Act of 1985, H.R. 1407, 99th Cong. (1985), which was designed to "inject
comprehensive due process safeguards into grand jury proceedings and insure their
protective role." Mark J. Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand Jury: Its
History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 63 (1996).
152. See Simmons, supra note 2, at 57.
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The second benefit of a more independent grand jury lies in the opportunity it
provides to engage citizens in the political process.'53 Apart from the grand jury,
few forums allow citizens in a modem democracy directly to critique and to
influence the actions of public officials. And few issues are nearer to the hearts and
minds of most members of a community than crime and public safety, as these
issues relate to them personally, and to the quality of life in the community at large.
While this justification has been dismissed as paternalistic and "condescending,"', 54
the criticism rings true only as long as the grand jury retains its current status as a
rubber stamp. Grand jurors empowered to exercise their discretion independently
might view differently the benefits of grand jury service.
Of course, there would be problems associated with a more independent grand
jury as well. Most importantly, an independent grand jury's refusal to indict
defendants might be a detriment to legitimate social policy. In addition to
frustrating the government's goal of prosecuting those who break the law, it might
also act in ways contrary to other important social ends, such as racial equality.
While these are important concerns, they do not outweigh the importance of
returning the grand jury to its historical and constitutional role. Grand juries that act
truly harmfully-as by refusing to indict a very dangerous criminal or by
consistently refusing to indict white defendants simply because of their race-are
unlikely to be common, because a grand jury whose members represent a cross-
section of the community can be trusted to consider the best interests of that
community. 55 If a grand jury is truly irresponsible, the prosecutor can remedy that
problem by re-presenting his case to another grand jury. Of course, this is true of
any case in which a grand jury refuses to indict, whatever the motives of the grand
jury. Ultimately, the decision whether to re-present lies with the prosecutor. The
prosecutor must be trusted to carefully consider the reasons why a grand jury might
have refused an indictment, and to respect the voice of the community unless truly
serious concerns compel re-presentation.
C. Suggested Changes to the Model Grand Jury Charge
The question of specific reforms remains. A modest yet potentially helpful
reform would be to change the way in which federal grand juries are instructed.
Traditionally, judges often treated the grand jury charge as an opportunity to orate,
often at length, about the greatness of the American political system and any
number of other topics. 157 Today, however, the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts has devised a Model Charge that it recommends be given to all grand
juries at the beginning of their service. 158 This grand jury charge should be
modified to reflect the true nature and function of the grand jury.
To begin with, an additional reform that has been proposed by Professor
Brenner would probably increase the efficacy of a change in the Model Charge.
153. See Brenner, supra note 9, at 121.
154. Leipold, supra note 5, at 317.
155. It is important to remember that for a federal grand jury to refuse to indict, at least
five and perhaps as many as twelve grand jurors must so agree, because the grand jury
requires a quorum of sixteen members to transact business, and twelve votes are needed to
indict. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
156. See supra note 133.
157. See YOUNGER, supra note 6, at 47-54.
158. United States v. Marcucci, 299 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002). For the relevant
text of the charge, see supra note 112.
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Her proposal calls for the creation of the position of grand jury counsel.' 59 The
grand jury counsel would be a lawyer independent of the prosecutor who would
advise the grand jury as to its role and powers. 16° Its purpose is to counteract the
need of the grand jury to rely exclusively on the prosecutor, who cannot be a truly
neutral party, for advice and information. 161 Because the grand jury is composed of
laypersons, it is possible that, without such an independent resource, any attempt at
reform based on changing the language of the grand jury charge might be doomed
to fail. Nevertheless, it appears that, given the current attitude and policies of the
courts and Congress toward the grand jury, a relatively major change such as this is
unlikely in the foreseeable future.
Even without the aid of the grand jury counsel, a change in the Model Charge
could have a positive impact on grand jury independence. The desirability of a
more comprehensive and informative charge has been raised. For example, in 2000
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACDL") proposed a
"Federal Grand Jury Bill of Rights."' 162 One of the proposed "rights" was that "[tihe
federal grand jurors shall be given meaningful jury instructions, on the record,
regarding their duties and powers as grand jurors .. ,16. However, specific
changes in the Model Charge have not been suggested.
Several specific changes could be instituted. First, the Model Charge should
not imply-as it presently does-that the sole function of the grand jury is to
determine whether there is probable cause to charge a defendant with a crime.' 
64
Instead, it should instruct the jurors explicitly that one of their roles is to provide
the voice of the community in the criminal justice system, and that this role
includes the power to decline to indict a defendant even when they find that
probable cause exists to support the charge.
Second, the provision in the Model Charge instructing the jurors that "[y]ou
cannot determine the wisdom of the criminal laws enacted by Congress ... that is
to be determined by Congress and not by you"' 65 should be removed. The
independent grand jury does have the prerogative to consider "the wisdom of the
laws enacted by Congress" in determining whether to indict. This is true
historically, and courts have implicitly recognized it by holding that grand juries
have the power to shield guilty individuals from prosecution.' 66 To suggest
otherwise cuts directly at the independence of the grand jury. 16 7
Third, the language in the instruction extolling the virtues of the prosecution-
"[I]f past experience is any indication of what to expect in the future, then you can
expect candor, honesty and good faith in matters presented by the government
attorneys"16s--should be removed. Though seemingly innocuous, this language
undercuts the open-mindedness that all grand jurors should bring to the experience.
In fact, it seems to suggest that the grand jurors need not seriously assess the
159. Brenner, supra note 9, at 124-26.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, Federal Grand Jury Bill of Rights,
CHAMPION, July 2000, at 21, 21-24.
163. Id. at 24.
164. See United States v. Marcucci, 299 F.3d 1156, 1167-69 (9th Cir. 2002) (Hawkins,
J., dissenting).
165. See supra note 112.
166. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986).
167. See Marcucci, 299 F.3d at 1168-69 (Hawkings, J., dissenting).
168. See supra note 112.
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credibility of the evidence the government presents. It also tends to reduce the
impression of grand jury independence, since honesty, candor, and good faith are
qualities that are likely to dispose the grand jurors positively toward the
government prosecutors. Prosecutors should be required to show that they possess
these qualities on their own, without the assistance of the Model Charge.
Fourth, the Model Charge language relating to the independence of the grand
jury169 should be emphasized by moving it to the beginning of the instruction. It
should also be reiterated in some form at the end of the charge. Independence is the
single most important aspect of the grand jury, and this should be reflected in the
Model Charge. The provisions relating to grand jury independence are themselves
quite forceful. Emphasizing them, as well as instructing the grand jury that its
independence expands beyond the boundaries of probable cause determinations, is
essential.
It is fair to ask whether these changes will make any difference-particularly if
the grand jury must still rely on the prosecutor for all of its guidance. The proposed
language reforms do not change the reality that grand juries often develop a close
rapport with the prosecutors with whom they work. They do not change the reality
that the Model Charge is given to grand jurors in the midst of an experience with
which they are likely to be unfamiliar and possibly uncomfortable. But at the least,
the proposed changes more accurately reflect the constitutional role of the grand
jury as it has been understood by history. At the most, a reformed instruction might
nudge the grand jurors into further discussion about their unique task, and,
ultimately, a more meaningful role as the voice of the community in the federal
criminal justice system. Unfortunately, given the attitude of Congress toward the
grand jury, it seems unlikely that even minor proposed changes such as these would
be greeted with enthusiasm.
CONCLUSION
As an independent body, the federal grand jury might be broken beyond repair.
The Ninth Circuit, in its analysis of the grand jury's function in Marcucci, simply
kicked it while it was down. If the grand jury is to regain any of its independence,
and to serve the important role of voice of the community, then grand jurors must
first be fully aware of the powers and responsibilities that come with their service.
Throughout their service, grand jurors ordinarily serve under the influence of
federal prosecutors. This is true because the prosecutors are the only lawyers with
whom the grand jurors have contact, because the prosecutors often cultivate a
positive rapport with the grand jurors, and because the prosecutors provide the only
guidance to the grand jurors, who are asked to apply difficult federal criminal law
to the cases before them. As a result, one of the grand jury's most important
historic roles--to provide the voice of the community at the charging phase of the
criminal justice system-has largely been lost.
This Note has analyzed the Ninth Circuit's decision in Marcucci, and
concluded that the majority's reasoning, while flawed, is consistent with the
modem federal judiciary's attitude toward the independent grand jury. This Note
has recognized that, for the past quarter century, despite concerns frequently voiced
by commentators, Congress has not been amenable to reforms that might help
restore the grand jury to its historically independent role. Nevertheless, modest
changes to the Model Grand Jury Charge given grand jurors at the outset of their
169. See id.
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service may have some effect in educating grand jurors as to their potential to
provide community input into the criminal justice system. Although structural
problems persist, reforming the Model Grand Jury Charge would be a small step in
the right direction.
